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ABSTRACT 
This Working Paper offers an institutional overview and comparative analysis of the 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) experiences of El Salvador (Red Solidaria) and Paraguay 
(Tekoporã). We focus on the potential contradictions and tensions that arise from the double 
objectives of these programmes—namely, short-run poverty alleviation and breaking the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty though human capital accumulation. We also 
examine how both programmes address these tensions and compare their approaches 
regarding implementation issues and administrative and institutional factors. We argue that 
political economy issues play an important role in the decisions taken regarding targeting 
criteria, monitoring of conditionalities, graduation from the programme, and exit rules. These 
programme features are not necessarily coherent with one another because they pursue 
different objectives and are justified by differing rationales. These problems might be 
exacerbated in a scenario—common in many developing countries—characterized by 
financial and institutional capacity constraints and, sometimes, weak political support for a 
CCT programme. 
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1  INTRODUCTION  
Conditional Cash Transfer programmes (CCTs) have been introduced in many Latin American 
countries during the last 10 years. Evaluations of first-generation CCT programmes 
implemented in middle-income countries, such as Mexico and Brazil,1 indicate considerable 
success in providing social assistance and short-term poverty relief while also tackling the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty through incentives for human capital investments 
(basically education, health and nutrition). These results have led many governments and 
international development organizations to regard such programmes as an effective way to 
promote social protection and help achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Nevertheless, there are still some uncertainties about the potential of CCTs in countries 
that face major institutional and financial constraints. Having strong institutional coordination 
and ensuring funds for a reasonable period of time are basic requirements for the success of 
CCT programmes. These requirements pose a major challenge for countries with weak 
institutional coordination among line ministries and/or layers of government, overwhelming 
budget restrictions for social investments, as well as the virtual absence of a tradition with 
regard to broad social protection schemes. 
A careful analysis of the design and implementation of CCTs in such countries might shed 
some light on how they have dealt with these challenges and what are the possibilities, limits 
and issues involved. In this sense, a range of aspects should be explored, including  the 
diagnosis of poverty causes, the programme strategy regarding targeting, the implementation 
and monitoring of conditionalities (or ‘co-responsibilities’, as they are sometimes called), 
administrative capacity and the coordination of CCTs with supply-side interventions (Britto, 
2005; de la Brière and Rawlings, 2006). 
In order to address these issues, this Working Paper offers an institutional overview and 
analysis of the cash transfer experiences of El Salvador (Red Solidaria) and Paraguay (Tekoporã). 
The CCT programmes in both countries started in 2005. As they are quite recent initiatives,  
we had the opportunity to examine them when adjustments and difficult choices regarding 
changes in the design or the implementation strategies were being made. Our analysis is 
based on a review of available documents, reports and papers on each programme, as well as 
semi-structured interviews and/or focus group discussions with key actors and strategic 
stakeholders (government and donor officials, programme coordinators, field workers, local 
researchers, community leaders, and beneficiary as well as non-beneficiary groups).  
In particular, our Working Paper provides a comparative overview of the main features of 
each programme and the implementation strategy that each used. Based on this comparative 
approach, our paper seeks to draw lessons and policy implications from these two experiences 
that could not only contribute to their future development, but also help the design of cash 
transfer programmes in other developing countries with similar characteristics.  
2  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CCTs: UNDERLYING ISSUES 
As pointed out by Handa and Davis (2006), there are some internal contradictions and 
potential tensions among CCT elements that have become evident as the implementation of 
these programmes has multiplied across Latin America. These contradictions tend to be 
exacerbated in countries that face institutional and financial constraints in implementing CCT Fábio Veras Soares  and  Tatiana Britto  3 
 
programmes.  In general, CCTs have double objectives: 1) to boost the accumulation of human 
capital in poor families, particularly for children, in order to break the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty; and 2) to alleviate poverty in the short run.  
It has been argued that the human capital objectives should be the focus of the 
programmes and that efficiency in the use of CCT funds should be enhanced via better 
targeting strategies (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2006). Along these lines, Handa and Davis (2006) 
have argued that the second objective—poverty reduction in the short run—is often stressed 
for political reasons.  A potential tension arises from the fact that the aim of short-run poverty 
alleviation might jeopardize some of the operational traits of a programme focused on the 
objective of human capital accumulation.  
However, CCT programmes can be evaluated from the opposite angle. The main objective 
can be seen as poverty alleviation, with human capital objectives added to gain political 
support from the general population. In fact, Handa and Davis (2006) state that sometimes 
conditionalities are included in cash transfer programmes in order to gain the support of the 
middle classes, which, it is thought, do not believe that it is acceptable to hand over money to 
the poor without requiring them to do something in return, e.g., send their children to school 
or attend health clinics.  
According to this view, conditionalities would be necessary to make the poor take 
responsibility for their own well-being, instead of relying on a state-centred paternalism. 
Molyneux (2006) argues that this emphasis on individual responsibility and self-help has been 
a strong component of the ‘New Poverty Agenda’, which has informed the development of 
many poverty-reduction initiatives in Latin America, including CCTs. 
At first glance, the focus on one or the other of the two objectives might appear to be 
irrelevant to the outcome of the programmes, but when one examines their details, the trade-
offs between the two objectives become too visible to be ignored. They are revealed in at  
least three programme dimensions: a) in the targeting strategy, b) in the monitoring of 
conditionalities and the implementation constraints that they impose, and c) in the exit  
(or graduation) rules and in the mechanisms for the incorporation of new beneficiaries. 
With regard to targeting criteria, the focus on human capital accumulation might leave 
important segments of the poor population out of the programmes, especially the elderly  
and the disabled. In such a context, it is clear that CCT programmes cannot be regarded as a 
comprehensive poverty reduction and/or social protection strategy.2 This feature would be 
even more evident if an ‘efficient targeting’ strategy were adopted, that is, if households more 
likely to send and keep their children in school would be more likely to become beneficiaries,  
This would result from an approach directed at maximizing programme impacts on human 
capital outcomes (through the effects on attendance and drop-out rates) at a low cost. The 
rationale behind this kind of approach would be to make CCT programmes cheaper and more 
effective by means of a narrower targeting of resources. 
One can easily draw an analogy between such an approach and a poverty reduction 
strategy that would give priority to those households closer to the poverty line, rather than 
those deeper in poverty. In this case, the efficient targeting strategy would seek to maximize 
the impact on the poverty headcount rather than the reduction of the poverty gap ratio. This 
targeting approach, however, would make sense only in a framework in which the governing 
objective of the CCT programme was human capital accumulation, with little concern for 
short-run poverty alleviation.  4  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 38 
Despite advocating a focus on human capital, neither Red Solidaria nor Tekoporã has 
adopted a targeting criterion based on the principle of maximizing the impact on human 
capital indicators, such as enrolment or attendance rates. Both programmes included 
geographical targeting prior to household targeting. El Salvador used a categorical targeting 
approach in the 32 poorest municipalities and intends to move to a methodology of proxy-
means testing for new municipalities. Paraguay, for its part, used a multidimensional index to 
estimate non-monetary poverty that is very similar to the one adopted by Familias en Acción in 
Colombia and Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico.  
Therefore, in terms of targeting strategy, short-run poverty alleviation seems to be the 
most important objective in both programmes. The argument that such an objective should 
be made compatible with human capital accumulation is based on the idea that poorer 
households are more likely to be credit-constrained, leading to a socially undesirable under-
investment in the human capital of their children. For that reason, poverty—either monetary 
poverty or multidimensional poverty—could be used as the targeting criteria of a CCT 
programme with a focus on human capital. 
The role of conditionalities is a major issue in its own right.3 But its relevance in this study 
is that it becomes central to a CCT when human capital accumulation is its major concern. For 
instance, the inclusion of remote poor areas in the programme can be delayed due to supply 
constraints that hinder the compliance with and the monitoring of conditionalities, as 
occurred in the renowned Progresa in Mexico in its initial phase. Moreover, for countries with 
limited institutional coordination, monitoring of the compliance with conditionalities can 
represent a sizeable share of the overall cost of the programme, both in monetary terms  
and in time spent by programme managers in coordinating monitoring with payments to 
beneficiaries. This process implies a fine-tuned coordination between line ministries and the 
implementing agency, and between the latter and the local institutions or partners in charge 
of monitoring at the grassroots level.  
Furthermore, the contradictions between the two objectives being discussed can become 
particularly striking when designing the exit or graduation rules and the mechanisms to 
incorporate new beneficiaries. If the focus of the programme is human capital accumulation, 
then it is reasonable to argue that monetary support should last for the whole basic health and 
education cycles. Nevertheless, most CCTs in Latin American countries have a time limit for 
households to remain in the programme—which, on average, is three years.4 After this period, 
families have their ‘poverty status’ re-evaluated and may be excluded from the programme.  
This approach is justified basically by two arguments: a) to avoid dependence, which ends 
up sacrificing the long-term impact on human capital of young household members because of 
the concern about possible negative impacts on the labour supply of adult members; and b) to 
give a chance to more—and perhaps poorer—families to participate in the programme within a 
context of limited funding. The latter does not apply in the case of El Salvador and Paraguay 
because there is no intention of incorporating new beneficiaries once the selection procedure is 
finished in a particular municipality. Thus, in their current design, these programmes have a 
static approach and target only the current generation under the age of 15 years. 
More recent CCT initiatives (the so-called third generation CCT programmes), largely 
inspired by the Programa Puente component of Chile Solidario,5 emphasize working together Fábio Veras Soares  and  Tatiana Britto  5 
 
with the beneficiary families so that they can find ‘exit doors’ from their current poverty status.  
This approach would imply integration with other policies and programmes within a broader 
development strategy.  
This seems to be one of the ‘new aspects’ that are present in the CCT programmes of both 
El Salvador and Paraguay. In El Salvador, one of the components of Red Solidaria is a ‘family 
sustainability network’, which offers micro-credit and promotes productive projects in the 
municipalities where the programme is being implemented. In Paraguay, the family support 
component uses ‘family guides’ to develop jointly with beneficiary families a strategy to 
improve their productive potential and to support the organization of committees of 
productive beneficiaries.  
The key question here is how these ‘development strategies’ fit into the logical framework 
of the programme, and how they interact with other programme objectives. For example, do 
they reduce potential contradictions or do they aggravate them? Do they receive enough 
funding and effectively promote synergies with their CCT counterparts? Have technologies 
been developed to tailor the existing programmes to the needs of beneficiaries?  
The ‘integral support’ that such programmes offer  to beneficiary households aims to 
build up the financial, social and human capital of adult family members so that they can 
improve their living conditions in a sustainable way, thereby enhancing their chances of rising 
out of poverty when they graduate from the programme. This approach shifts the focus from 
human capital accumulation to short- to medium-run activities that could work as exit-door 
strategies. This move towards economic opportunities, empowerment and income-generating 
activities for the adult members of the beneficiary household has arisen as a response to the 
criticism that CCT programmes do not change the poverty situation of the family in the short 
run and might, in fact, generate dependence.6  
Similar to the case of the cost of conditionalities, we have here the issue of the cost of 
these more comprehensive developmental strategies within a social protection framework. 
Hiring family guides or NGOs to work with beneficiary families can reduce the funds 
available to incorporate a higher number of (eligible) beneficiaries. It is worth mentioning 
that the Puente/Chile Solidario model was developed based on the understanding that there 
was  ‘core poverty’, identified as the extremely poor who do not benefit from general 
economic growth. This model may not be relevant for countries where both extreme and 
moderate poverty are widespread and where the social and economic infrastructure has not 
been well developed. 
Finally, an important consideration in countries with institutional and financial constraints 
is related to the substantial influence that international organizations and consultants from 
‘older’ CCTs have on the conception of new programmes. This affects the programme’s initial 
design and objectives, leading to problems in terms of applicability to the local context, 
country ownership and, as a result, programme impacts and sustainability. 
In the next sections we will discuss how Red Solidaria and Tekoporã have dealt with the 
challenges posed by the design and implementation of CCT programmes in the light of the 
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3  AN OVERVIEW OF RED SOLIDARIA AND TEKOPORÃ 
3.1  ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES 
Both Red Solidaria in El Salvador and the Tekoporã pilot programme in Paraguay started officially 
in 2005, but their origins were different. Whereas targeted income support was already 
mentioned in the government plan presented by the elected right-wing party candidate 
(Antonio Elias Saca, from the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista - ARENA) in the 2004 presidential 
elections in El Salvador,7 in Paraguay the first suggestion of a cash transfer scheme came from a 
technical committee in charge of the design of the National Strategy for Fighting Poverty. 
President Antonio Elias Saca’s government plan for the 2004-2009 presidential term 
envisaged the creation of a social safety net for El Salvador’s most vulnerable population. 
Social protection is defined in that document as the set of public policies that give support to 
the poorest and most vulnerable, helping them to overcome risk factors. Thus, it had  a risk 
management approach. In this approach, social protection should enhance human capital by 
comprising both labour market policies and targeted cash transfers. The conceptual design of 
Red Solidaria occurred between 2004 and the beginning of 2005; and the programme was 
officially launched by a presidential decree in March 2005.8 The IDB and the World Bank were 
closely involved in the initial design of the Red, which also benefited from consultancies of 
experts and programme managers of other CCTs implemented in Latin America. 
In Paraguay, the origins of Tekoporã can be traced back to the government’s signing of 
the Millennium Declaration in 2000. The government took the decision to support the design 
of a National Strategy for Fighting Poverty that would encompass a set of actions and 
programmes in the social sector but would have a focus on poverty reduction.9 In the first 
drafts of the strategy, the idea of a cash transfer emerged. This occurred mainly due to the 
missions that members of the technical team had undertaken to other Latin American 
countries, especially to Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico in order to obtain detailed 
knowledge of their CCT programmes (Rivarola, 2006).  In November 2003, already under a new 
administration, a CCT design team was established with technical and financial support from 
the IDB (US$ 380,000).   
However, the idea of implementing a cash transfer programme was received with  
some uneasiness by segments of the government and civil society in Paraguay. There was a 
perception that handing money out to the poor—even with conditionalities attached—would 
not be an appropriate way to combat poverty due to a predicted negative impact on the 
supply of labour. There was a strong feeling that the programme could generate dependency.  
In the face of this resistance, an international conference was organized in July 2004 by the 
design team to present a draft of the National Strategy for Fighting Poverty and to showcase 
several Latin American CCT programmes. After this conference, the idea of a CCT programme 
gained support and the government started the preparation for its launching. Tekoporã was not 
launched by specific legislation, but was introduced through the budget law for 2005.  
Red Solidaria’s legislation (the above mentioned executive decree) laid the programme’s 
foundations in terms of objectives, duration, assigned resources and institutional coordination. 
It states that the Red’s objective is assistance to extremely poor families, through short-term 
improvements in child and maternal health and nutrition, basic education, as well as Fábio Veras Soares  and  Tatiana Britto  7 
 
improvements in the supply of drinking water, sanitation, electrification and roads to the 
poorest rural communities of the country.  
The programme encompasses the following components, described as tools to broaden the 
opportunities of the disadvantaged population to improve their economic and social conditions: 
1) The Family Solidarity Network, comprised of conditional cash transfers and ‘lifelong learning’ 
sessions for beneficiary families; 2) The Network of Basic Services, comprised of supply-side 
programmes in education (Effective Schools Network), health and nutrition (Extension of Health 
Services), and improvements and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure (drinking water, sanitation, 
electrification and rural roads); and 3) The Family Sustainability Network, comprised of 
productive projects and micro-credit schemes in the targeted municipalities.  
In the absence of a legal document that sets the objectives and implementation details of 
the Tekoporã, one has to examine the operational manuals10—where the logical framework is 
presented—as the main source of institutional information on the programme’s stated 
objectives and approach. According to the manuals, the main objective of Tekoporã is to 
reduce the number of households living in extreme poverty through cash transfers conditional 
on families undertaking certain actions aimed at developing the human capital of their 
members. As secondary objectives, the manuals mention: 1) increasing expenditures on food 
items and 2) increasing expenditures on inputs required to maintain an adequate level of 
nutrition for children and ensure their school attendance.11 
There are clearly similarities between the two programmes: a) the focus on the extremely 
poor as the target population and b) the focus on nutritional and educational outcomes.  
A remarkable difference between them, however, is the infrastructure component of Red 
Solidaria, with its focus on the access to drinking water and sanitation, electricity and rural 
roads. Both programmes share the diagnosis that one of the causes of poverty is the low level 
of human capital of the extremely poor.  
Therefore, their major aim is to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty through cash 
transfers that, while alleviating poverty in the short run, are also conditional on certain actions, 
such as regular health check-ups and school attendance. There is also the explicit message 
that the monetary benefit should be spent in the best interests of the children, i.e., on items 
that would improve their nutritional condition and their school performance. 
3.2  TARGET POPULATION, TARGETING TOOLS, COVERAGE AND GOALS 
The target population of both programmes—given their objectives—is extremely poor 
households with children under the age of 15 years or with pregnant women. How to reach 
such households, how many to incorporate into the programme and in accordance with what 
priorities are the fundamental questions to be answered by the targeting methods. Despite 
their focus on extreme poverty, neither Tekoporã nor Red Solidaria seeks to cover the whole 
population living in extreme poverty.  
In the case of Red Solidaria, there is not only a rural emphasis, but also a focus on the 100 
municipalities classified as the poorest ones in the country. Based on this orientation, the 
implementation of Red Solidaria, in particular of its CCT component, has been a phased one. 
The first transfers took place in October 2005; 15 municipalities were included in that year and 
a total of 13,278 beneficiary families. In 2006, 17 other municipalities and 10,828 families were 
added. This completed the coverage of the first group of 32 municipalities characterized by 8  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 38 
‘very high extreme poverty’ (pobreza extrema severa), according to the classification adopted in 
the country’s poverty map. For 2007, the programme intends to reach another 15 municipalities, 
covering about 45,000 families. Up until 2009, the programme projects to reach 100,000 poor 
families, approximately the total number of poor and extremely poor households in the 
targeted municipalities. 
In Paraguay’s Tekoporã, the goal established in the 2004 operational manual was to reach 
162,600 households by 2008. According to this figure, the programme would cover all 
households with at least one child below the age of 15 years or a pregnant woman living in 
extreme poverty. However, this goal has been reduced in the 2007 operational manual to 
45,000 households by 2009—28 per cent of the original target for 2008. In 2005, the pilot of 
the programme started in five municipalities in two different departments and covered a total 
of 3,452 beneficiaries by the end of that year. In 2006, the programme was scaled up to include 
another seven municipalities with 5,386 beneficiary families. The target for 2007 is to 
incorporate 18,000 new beneficiary families in 16 municipalities in five departments. 
Both programmes have implemented geographical targeting in order to rank 
municipalities according to their poverty level. Red Solidaria has used a poverty map 
developed by FLACSO, which comprises two types of ranking criteria: a cluster analysis that 
identifies four levels of poverty and a within-cluster ranking of municipalities according to a 
marginality index. The cluster analysis attempts to combine long-standing structural and 
current dimensions of poverty. In order to do so, it uses 1) the proportion of 1st grade students 
with a severe height-for-age deficit (stunting); and 2) the incidence of income poverty (poverty 
headcount). Based on these indicators, the programme grouped municipalities into the 
following categories: 1) Very high extreme poverty, comprising 32 municipalities; 2) High 
extreme poverty, comprising 68 municipalities; 3) Moderate extreme poverty, comprising 82 
municipalities; and 4) Low extreme poverty, comprising 80 municipalities. 
The 100 municipalities that make up the first two categories were identified as the target 
of Red Solidaria. The Integrated Index of Municipal Marginality (IIMM), which was used to rank 
municipalities within the clusters, combines and weights 1) the monetary aspects of 
deprivation, measured by the income poverty gap of each municipality, with 2) indicators 
related to unsatisfied basic needs in housing and education, such as access to piped water, 
sanitation and electricity; crowding; prevalence of earth floors; illiteracy and schooling rates. 
The sequence of inclusion of each targeted municipality into Red Solidaria has carefully 
respected the poverty-map ranking. The first 32 municipalities classified under the very high 
extreme poverty category were the first to be included, according to their IIMM position. In 
2007, the programme is expanding its reach to include the second cluster, i.e., the high 
extreme poor, also following the IIMM ranking.  
For the household targeting, different criteria have been used. In the rural areas of the  
32 municipalities that belong to the first cluster, because of the severity of their poverty, every 
family with pregnant women and children under 15 years of age who have not finished 6th 
grade have been selected as potential beneficiaries. In urban areas, in addition to the 
categorical criteria, the following additional parameters have been included: crowding, 
housing conditions (material used on roof, walls and floor), and access to sanitation.12  
For the 68 municipalities belonging to the second cluster, the high extreme poor, the Red’s 
operational manual details a proxy-means test (PMT) that would combine variables related to Fábio Veras Soares  and  Tatiana Britto  9 
 
the household location (rural or urban), housing conditions, possession of durable goods, 
family composition and characteristics, and access to remittances.13  
In the case of Tekoporã, the geographical targeting was based on the Índice de Priorización 
Geográfica (IPG)14—the Geographical Prioritization Index. Each district would enter the 
programme according to its ranking by the IPG and the number of households to be selected 
in the district would be given by the estimated proportion of the extremely poor. The IPG 
combines both monetary and non-monetary poverty indicators as proxied by the unsatisfied 
basic needs approach (NBI).  
Monetary poverty had a weight of 40 per cent in the IPG15 and comprised two indicators: 
1) the ratio between the proportion of the extremely poor in the district and the proportion of 
the extremely poor in the department; and 2) the ratio between the proportion of the 
extremely poor and the proportion of the poor in the district. The indicator for unsatisfied 
basic needs (NBI) had a weight of 60 per cent. It was comprised of an indicator of housing 
conditions and access to infrastructure, which had a weight of 30 per cent in the NBI, and an 
indicator of educational achievement and access to education, which had a weight of the 
remaining 70 per cent.  
Municipalities with an IPG score above 18 points were classified as high priority. However, 
unlike the approach of Red Solidaria, municipalities did not enter the programme according to 
the priority criteria16 since supply-side constraints were taken into account in the selection of 
the districts that took part in the pilot and in the preparation for the scaling-up.17  
Tekoporã differs from Red Solidaria in its targeting approach. For the poorest 
municipalities, Red Solidaria used a categorical targeting approach based on geographical area 
(rural emphasis) and the demographic composition of the household (pregnant women and 
children under 15 years of age). In contrast, Tekoporã uses a multidimensional index derived 
from a principal component analysis to prepare a list of potential beneficiaries of the 
programme in both rural and urban areas.  
This index, the Índice de calidad de vida (ICV), or Quality of Life Index, combines several 
sub-indices: 1) access to services: water, electricity, fuel to cook, rubbish collection and 
telephone; 2) health: health insurance, health care for the sick or injured (during the past three 
months), children’s vaccination status; 3) education: language spoken at home, the household 
head’s education level, the spouse’s education level, years of schooling ‘lost’ by the children 
aged 6 to 24 years; 4) occupation: the household head’s occupation; 5) housing condition: 
crowding; ceiling, wall and floor material, separated toilet, sanitation; 6) possession of durable 
goods: air-conditioner, heater, truck, cars, refrigerator and washing machine; and 7) number  
of children aged 0 to 15 years old. These variables were selected according to two different 
models applied to the 2001 Household Survey (Encuesta Integrada de Hogares), one for rural 
and another for urban areas. These models yielded different weights for each area.  
Households are classified into four groups: the extreme poor (group I - ICV<25 points), the 
moderate poor (group II - ICV between 25 and 40 points), and two non-poor groups: group III 
(ICV between 41 and 55 points) and group IV (ICV above 55 points). In principle, only group I, 
the proxy for the (monetarily measured) extreme poor, should be eligible to take part in the 
programme. However, since the targeted number of potential beneficiaries that was based on 
estimating the number of extreme poor for each district was not reached through this ICV 10  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 38 
proxy, the selection criterion was expanded to include group II. Therefore, the programme also 
incorporated the moderate poor into the pool of potential beneficiaries.18  
The identification of potential beneficiaries is undertaken in both countries through a 
census process. However, whereas in El Salvador the census covered the whole municipality,  
in Paraguay during the pilot phase (covering five districts) the census was conducted only in 
neighbourhoods of selected districts with two or more unsatisfied basic needs. This option  
was chosen because of the lack of funds to conduct the survey in the whole district.  
Another difference resulted from the fact that the census in El Salvador was based on a 
participatory process that involved the local community in the mapping process, whereas in 
Paraguay the whole process was initially centralized at the National Statistics Office (DGECC) 
and afterwards outsourced to private firms. Curiously, El Salvador followed the opposite 
direction: the first census was outsourced to private firms, but the Red’s implementing 
agency has gradually taken over the whole process, subcontracting, training and supervising 
researchers directly. 
The categorical approach in rural areas adopted by Red Solidaria in its poorest 
municipalities is not very common in Latin America, where multidimensional indices, such as 
the ones adopted in Mexico, Chile and Colombia, have been the prevailing method used to 
select beneficiary households after some degree of geographical targeting that also takes into 
account monetary poverty indicators. In Paraguay, the targeting strategy was inspired by the 
Colombian case, which also relies on a multidimensional index instead of focusing on means 
testing or proxy means testing. However, instead of keeping the weights a secret, as was the 
case in the Colombian SISBEN, the programme made the weighting process public to the local 
reviewing committee – comite de seleccion de beneficiarios. 
The bottlenecks encountered in the targeting process in El Salvador result mostly from 
the unclear procedures undertaken to select beneficiaries in urban areas. This approach added 
special parameters to the categorical targeting criteria, which had to be verified through a 
second visit to the potential beneficiaries selected on the basis of the census database. There 
has also been a problem resulting from the static nature of the census process—the only basis 
on which entrance into the programme is determined—since this approach does not consider 
the demographic dynamics of the households. For example, new children might be born or 
new families might move into the municipality after the census has been completed, but they 
will not be identified as potential beneficiaries. Finally, the adoption of a proxy means test to 
select beneficiaries in the municipalities of the second cluster might create new difficulties 
because the programme’s targeting criteria will become less clear to beneficiaries. 
In Paraguay, a serious bottleneck has been encountered in the selection of neighbourhoods 
within pilot districts where the census would take place. There was a major outcry among local 
representatives, mostly members of the reviewing committees, which led the programme 
managers to accept some households to be interviewed based on demand. This had been 
specified in the 2004 operational manual as occurring in a later stage (empadronamiento 
continuo)19 in order to obtain information on (extreme) poor families in non-selected 
neighbourhoods in the pilot district. Another problem that has been observed is the adoption of 
the same cut-off point for the ICV in both rural and urban areas (i.e., below a 40-point score). But 
this would render meaningless any comparison between rural and urban beneficiaries.20 Fábio Veras Soares  and  Tatiana Britto  11 
 
A distinguishing feature of the targeting process in Paraguay is the validation of the list of 
potential beneficiaries by the local reviewing committee. This committee, which is made up 
of local representatives, is responsible to review the list of all potential beneficiaries and 
approve their selection. A similar structure exists in El Salvador, but the programme reviews 
only the list of the potential urban beneficiaries according to the above-mentioned approach.21 
Relative or absolute poverty measures were central to the geographical targeting used in 
both countries. But this kind of targeting begs the question about which of the two 
programme objectives, i.e., short-run poverty alleviation or long-term capital accumulation, is 
being emphasized. It is fairly clear that a cash-transfer scheme that focused on human capital 
accumulation would hardly gain ‘civil society’ support if it did not also use some targeting 
criteria based on current poverty conditions, but, instead, opted to rely only on selecting  
the population that would maximize the human capital achievements of the programme  
(see De Janvry and Sadoulet (2004)).  
While these programmes do not take into account the ways of maximizing their impact 
on long-run human capital accumulation in their targeting strategy, as mentioned above, 
they do not rely exclusively on a monetary approach to target extremely poor families.  
Red Solidaria has opted for simple categorical targeting: eligible households in rural areas in 
the poorest 32 municipalities. The rationale underpinning this strategy is the pervasiveness 
of poverty in these areas.22  
Targeting individual households in this context would lead to unjustifiable costs in terms 
of trying to achieve programme efficiency. Hypothetically, it could also lead to social tensions 
within small, isolated communities, as have been reported in the first evaluations of  
the Mexican pioneer CCT (Adato et al, 2000). Additionally, the private costs involved in the 
process of becoming a beneficiary and collecting the benefits are assumed to be a disincentive 
to non-poor families, working as a tool for self-targeting.  
The Tekoporã programme has opted to use a multidimensional index (ICV) that is not 
directly linked to a monetary poverty measure. In fact, the latter is considered only in the 
calculation of the Geographical Prioritization Index (IPG), which is used to determine the priority 
with which a municipality is incorporated into the programme. Still left unanswered is the 
rationale for using multidimensional indexes to select beneficiaries of a CCT programme vis-à-vis 
its two major objectives. Does this imply, for example, that in addition to alleviating current 
monetary poverty and promoting human capital accumulation, cash transfer programmes 
should be designed to compensate for the lack of economic opportunities and lack of access to 
basic public services? Or is the use of such indices justified as a means to address the lack of 
reliable information on earnings and/or proxies for earnings in a rural setting? Also, if human 
capital is a central objective, does it make sense to combine educational indicators with so many 
other variables (unless these variables were strongly correlated)? 
3.3  AMOUNT OF THE TRANSFERS 
In Red Solidaria, the cash transfers provided by the programme comprise a health stipend for 
families with pregnant women and children under five years-old and an education stipend for 
families with children from five to 15 years old who have not completed 6th grade (the second 
cycle of basic education). Each stipend is worth US$ 15 (US$ 13 PPP) per month, but a family 
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variations in the amount of the transfers according to the size of the family or the age, grade or 
gender of the beneficiary children. The fact that the amount of the transfer does not increase 
with the number of beneficiary children in the household seems to be related to the fear that 
the programme might have some impact on fertility rates either by increasing the desired 
number of children or by anticipating pregnancies in order to benefit from the transfer. 
In Tekoporã, there is a basic benefit related to food and nutrition worth Gs 60.000  
(or US$ 11 PPP) regardless of the number of children aged 0 to 15 years old and a nutrition  
and education bonus worth Gs 30.000 (about US$ 5 PPP) per child with an accumulation limit 
of four children, so that the maximum payable benefit is Gs 180.000 (about US$ 32 PPP).  
According to the 2004 operational manual, this value was calculated to cover the average 
poverty gap of the two bottom deciles of the per capita income distribution. However, an 
examination of the data shows that this benefit is far below that necessary to close the poverty 
gap of an average beneficiary family. Actually, the small amount of the transfer is consistent 
with the argument used by some managers that the focus of the programme should be 
human capital accumulation. Thus, the benefit should be kept low in order to avoid work 
disincentives among the adult members of the household. 
3.4  CONDITIONALITIES AS CO-RESPONSIBILITIES 
Families selected through the targeting procedures described above are invited to take part  
in Tekoporã and Red Solidaria through signing an agreement: an acta de compromiso, in the 
former programme, and a convenio de corresponsabilidades, in the latter.  
In Red Solidaria, the family agreement has to be signed by the main beneficiary and a  
co-responsible person. If, once selected, the family agrees to take part in the programme, the 
agreement spells out the co-responsibilities not only on the part of the beneficiary family, but 
also on the part of the government of El Salvador. For the family, the agreement includes the 
following obligations: 1) Ensure school enrolment and attendance of their 5-14 year-olds,  
from pre-school to 6th grade; 2) Register the family in health programmes, ensure child and 
maternal health check-ups and comply with the basic child and maternal health protocols and 
immunizations; 3) Attend the family training sessions offered by Red Solidaria; and 4) Use the 
transfers provided by Red Solidaria on food consumption.  
For the government, the obligations include: 1) Through the Ministry of Health, provide 
basic health services in health units or other institutions subcontracted for this purpose;  
2) Through the Ministry of Education, provide basic education up to 6th grade to beneficiary 
children between the ages of 5 and 14; 3) Promote lifelong learning sessions for beneficiary 
families; and 4) Deliver the cash transfer, conditional on school enrolment and regular 
attendance of the beneficiary children (based on the education stipend) and on accessing the 
periodical child and maternal health check-ups and immunizations for children under 5 years-
old (based on the health stipend). 
With regard to Tekoporã, the acta de compromiso does not list all the government  
co-responsibilities. It commits the government to the monthly payment of the stipend  
and to the continuous follow-up of the families, but does not mention anything related to 
the supply side aspects of the co-responsibility. The member responsible for the family  
(the titular) commits to the following conditionalities: 1) use the benefit to purchase food,  
so that the nutritional status of the children would improve; 2) undertake a first visit to the 
health centre for a diagnosis of the health and nutritional condition of each child younger Fábio Veras Soares  and  Tatiana Britto  13 
 
than 15 years and of each pregnant woman; 3) guarantee that the children are not delayed 
in their immunization schedule; 4) guarantee that women (pregnant or not) and teenagers 
visit the heath clinic according to its protocol; 5) use the education stipend to buy school-
related material; 6) enrol all children younger than 15 years-old in school; and 7) ensure  
85 per cent minimum school attendance by them.  
In both programmes, the agreement expresses the conditions under which the transfer 
shall be suspended and entails an authorization for the family to be withdrawn from the 
programme if it is confirmed that it no longer fulfils its eligibility criteria. 
The conditionalities for the transfers applied in both countries encompass the usual 
engagement in health and education activities that are found in most CCTs across the region. 
Nevertheless, their agreements go beyond such past practices when they set up conditions 
related to the use of the transfers. In Red Solidaria, the agreement also obliges the participation 
of family members in lifelong learning sessions, a condition that is monitored even though  
it should not affect the cash transfers. In contrast, the commitment to use the cash transfers  
on food is not actually monitored. In fact, it could be understood as part of an awareness 
campaign to change attitudes and to reinforce the human capital focus of the programme. 
However, its inclusion in the agreement is confusing, since it is stated in that document that 
families can lose their benefits if they do not comply with such commitments. 
Similarly to Red Solidaria, the Tekoporã programme does not enforce the condition that 
the transfer should be spent on food and on school-related expenses. However, ‘family guides’ 
stress the message that the transfer should be spent in order to promote the best interest of 
the child. Unlike Red Solidaria, in Tekoporã the participation in family training sessions and  
in complementary activities, such as beneficiaries’ productive committees, are not listed as 
conditionalities in the acta de compromiso. However, it is unclear how family guides, in 
practice, inform families about the actual requirements with which they need to comply  
in order to continue in the programme.  
In our focus group discussions, some family guides admitted that sometimes they  
might inform the families that attendance in the training sessions and participation in the 
beneficiaries committee can increase their likelihood of staying in the programme after the 
initial three-year period. This might increase the perception of the families that those activities 
are conditionalities of the programme.  
According to the data from the impact evaluation of the pilot, among the 361 beneficiary 
households in the sample, 3.6 per cent did not know any of the requirements related to staying 
in the programme, 85 per cent mentioned that attendance in school was one of the requirements, 
70.5 per cent mentioned regular visits to health centres and 60 per cent mentioned the child’s 
immunizations. Only 5.3 per cent mentioned the need to cultivate vegetable gardens and a mere 
2.5 per cent mentioned maintaining the hygiene of the household. Surprisingly, 5.8 per cent said 
that the programme had no conditionality attached to it.  
3.5  GRADUATION RULES 
In line with the conceptual and operational guidelines of Red Solidaria’s legal framework and 
operational manual, the family agreement explicitly states a 3-year period for eligibility— 
namely, each family is entitled to receive the transfers for these three years only. This clause 
seemed very clear to most beneficiaries and all programme managers and stakeholders 
interviewed during the research field work. What did not appear clear to them was what  
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regardless of the persistence of the eligibility conditions that had entitled them to be selected 
in the first place? Or would the programme have some kind of transition or phasing-out 
strategy that would graduate families and avoid the interruption of the transfers in the middle 
of a school or immunization cycle?  
According to the Red’s operational manual, the exit strategy of the programme comprises 
undertaking a re-evaluation of each family after they have received transfers for three years. 
This re-evaluation would take into account whether families still had children younger than  
five years-old (for continued eligibility for the health stipend), or whether they had children 
between five and 15 years-old that had not finished primary education, or 6th grade (which 
would entitle them to continue receiving the education stipend). Nevertheless, the manual 
stresses that the questionnaire and the criteria to be used in this re-evaluation process are 
subject to validation by the inter-institutional Directive Council of Red Solidaria and to the 
availability of financial resources from the government of El Salvador. 
So far, the issue of graduation from the programme or re-certification of eligibility does 
not seem to be a very important one for El Salvador’s CCT agenda. On the one hand, this might 
be due to the novelty of the programme, which has existed for less than a year and a half and 
still has not had to deal with this potentially difficult issue. On the other hand, it might be 
related to the Red’s central objective: to improve human capital rather than merely reducing 
current income poverty. As such, the acceptable ‘exit door’ from the programme would seem 
to be a demographic one. This would contrast with reliance on ‘emancipation’ strategies that 
are hypothetically able to lift beneficiaries out of poverty—an outcome that depends among 
many other factors on the labour market and economic performance of the country, as well as 
on synergistic coordination among various social programmes.23  
With regard to Tekoporã, the explicit limit of three years in the programme is not 
mentioned in the acta de compromiso. Actually, the acta de compromiso states that the 
‘contract’ between the programme and the recipient of the benefit is valid until the end of 
each calendar year and can be extended if the two parties agree. However, the ‘agreement 
mechanism’ for the renewal of the ‘contract’ is not made clear in that document. Nevertheless, 
the operational manual states that families can stay in the programme up to three years as 
long as they maintain their eligibility status, i.e., they have a child younger than 15 years old 
and he/she is attending any grade of the basic education cycle (from 1st to 9th grade).  
After the three-year period, the registry system of the programme will provide an 
assessment report on the beneficiary households, with indicators derived from the monitoring 
system.24 Those indicators refer to the family’s progress in undertaking the various steps of the 
family support activities, which will be monitored by the family guides.  
The three-year period is divided into four steps, in which the families, with the support 
of the family guides, are supposed to undertake several activities.25 These include: allowing 
family guide’s visits in order to discuss the conditionalities, health and hygiene issues, 
nutritional habits, as well as attendance at adult literacy courses and training sessions.  
The review of these indicators will show whether the family has achieved the targets in  
the various steps.26 If so, the family graduates from the programme; if not, the family will 
continue in the programme for two more years; however, the value of the benefit will be 
reduced to the minimum amount of the transfer.  
In-situ visits and interviews with beneficiaries and family guides clarified that most 
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about the re-assessment of the families after three years and the possibility of staying a bit 
longer in the programme thought that they would be allowed to stay beyond the  
three-year period only if they complied with the conditionalities and performed well  
in the complementary activities agreed with the family guides.27 However, this is precisely  
the approach that would render them not eligible for the two-year extension.  
Most CCTs include, at least in principle, an explicit time limit after which families should 
be re-assessed. The three-year period is a fairly common threshold.28 But the theoretical or 
empirical justifications for such time limits are unclear (Cohen and Franco, 2006). They seem to 
be driven mostly by fiscal or political considerations, associated with fears that transfers might 
become financially unsustainable, be perceived as permanent entitlements and create 
dependence of beneficiaries.  
Another possibility, as we mentioned above, is that the three-year period is introduced in 
order to give time for the programme to win political support on the basis of achievements 
that are feasible within such a short period. In countries that rely heavily on external funding 
for their CCTs (not the case of either El Salvador or Paraguay during their initial stages), the 
duration of the programme might also be related to the duration of the contracted loans. 
Some CCTs have introduced transition rules, which include not only recertification 
strategies, but also the use of declining stipends as a phasing-out mechanism. In the case of 
Oportunidades in Mexico, families are re-assessed every three years through the same survey 
used for their selection for the programme. If the family is still considered in extreme poverty 
according to the programme’s multidimensional index, it will continue receiving the transfers 
as before. However, if the family is not considered to be in poverty anymore, it will follow the 
phasing-out process of the Esquema Diferenciado de Apoyo (EDA), which was created in 2003.29  
Families stay in EDA for a period that varies from one to three years, but several 
components of the transfers are cut out, implying a substantial reduction in their value  
(Cohen and Villatoro, 2006). So far, almost five million families have been re-assessed and 
around 300,000 have been passed onto the EDA stage. However, only 0.11 per cent of the five 
million beneficiary families had been graduated from the programme by the end of 2006. 
The distance between what is effectively carried out and the programme’s discourse, as 
well as the actual difficulties associated with adopting a coherent and transparent graduation 
strategy, have contributed to highlight graduation rules as part of the ‘unfinished agenda of 
CCTs’ in Latin America (de la Brière and Rawlings, 2006). A crucial issue in this respect is that 
graduation rules have to be shaped according to the programme’s central objectives. From  
the perspective of human capital accumulation, which is the main objective stressed by Red 
Solidaria and Tekoporã, short time limits—if strictly applied—might be counterproductive, 
especially if they are not sufficient to cover the entire basic education or immunizations cycles 
(Handa and Davis, 2006; Cohen and Franco, 2006; Soares and Ribas, forthcoming). 
4  IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES:  DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES 
4.1  TRANSFER MECHANISMS 
In El Salvador, transfers are delivered bi-monthly in payment events that usually take place  
in the municipality’s main square and might occupy the whole morning, depending on the 
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a banking institution, which organizes the logistics of the payments, including the transport of 
the funds, maintaining security and providing cashiers. This experience differs from that of 
Brazil, for instance, which counts on a fairly developed and widespread banking network that 
allows an automated scheme for the delivery of transfers through money-teller machines and 
magnetic cards. In contrast, Red Solidaria’s transfers are handled manually and involve the 
deployment of considerable amounts of money and personnel across the country.  
The local coordination of Red Solidaria has an important role in the organization of 
payment events. A whole payment schedule is set up and beneficiaries are lined up according 
to this schedule and their exact placement in the transfer’s spreadsheet. This is designed to 
rationalize the process, shortening the time that beneficiaries have to queue to receive their 
transfers. Still, there can be significant costs to beneficiaries in attending the payment event, 
not only in terms of time but also transportation, especially for those living in more remote 
rural communities. 
Tekoporã’s 2004 operational manual stated that transfers would be paid bi-monthly in  
the nearest bank. However, this was changed before implementation began, based on the 
assumption that poor families were not used to managing large sums of money and planning 
their expenditures throughout a long period of time. Also, using bank offices could impose 
excessive costs for families living far from towns where these services are located.  
The solution was to deliver transfers through a mobile unit with cashiers of a state bank 
(Banco Nacional de Fomento), which go to programme districts on various dates. Besides the 
costs associated with the deployment of this single mobile unit, there is another problem that 
is particularly important for beneficiaries: there is no fixed date for the transfer payment. Since 
delays can be as long as 50 days, this tends to have almost the same effect as a bi-monthly 
delivery, except that such delays make it more difficult for beneficiaries to rely on the transfers 
for consumption credit or investment plans. According to the data collected for the impact 
evaluation, 85 per cent of the beneficiaries said that the payment is usually delayed. Counting 
on a single mobile unit for the delivery of the transfers, in a monthly payment scheme, seems a 
clear bottleneck for scaling-up Tekoporã.30 
Similar to Red Solidaria, the local coordination of Tekoporã—in particular, that of the 
family guides—has an important role in organizing the beneficiaries for the payment. During 
the payment, personnel from the implementing agency at the national level as well as the 
department supervisor are there to address questions and receive written complaints about 
the programme. The local-level agents of the programme, i.e., the family guides and the 
departmental supervisors, are also paid on this occasion. 
4.2  MONITORING OF CONDITIONALITIES 
As CCTs, both Tekoporã and Red Solidaria involve conditionalities or co-responsibilities in health 
and education that are connected to the cash transfers. Nevertheless, there are important 
differences in the implementation of the monitoring processes related to these conditionalities. 
In Paraguay, initial plans indicated that the information flow regarding conditionalities 
would be based on the coordination between the national implementing agency (SAS), 
which would generate lists of beneficiaries by school and health post, and the departmental 
units, which would send these lists to district units for further distribution among the 
corresponding schools and health posts. The units would then send bi-monthly feedback to 
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In practice, monitoring the compliance with conditionalities by beneficiaries has not been 
achieved.31 Difficulties in the coordination with line ministries and local health and education 
personnel, the absence of a departmental unit for the programme (only solved with the 
creation of an intermediary supervisor, to be discussed below) as well as failures in the data 
collection about schools and health posts used by beneficiaries prevented the success of the 
process as planned. In 2006, an attempt to control enrolment in two pilot municipalities has 
generated some illegitimate reductions in the transfers to some families in those districts, 
generating a great deal of complaints because of errors in the lists passed onto the schools. 
The monitoring process in Paraguay has been recently changed to include a stronger 
participation of the local family guides in solidifying the links between families and the 
institutional authorities in charge of transmitting the information to the central government. 
Additionally, the verification of school enrolment and health check-ups depend on beneficiary 
mothers making sure their co-responsibility forms are duly stamped by schools and health 
posts, instead of relying only on the health and education personnel. 
This is already the case in El Salvador, where the flow of information regarding 
conditionalities falls primarily under the responsibility of the NGOs32 for family support  
and follow-up. These institutions work as the main link between beneficiaries and the 
programme. When a family enters the programme, it receives an annual form for the control  
of co-responsibilities, which has to be stamped by health posts and schools, as well as by  
the NGOs themselves with regard to attending the lifelong training sessions that are also  
part of Red Solidaria.  
The NGOs are in charge of monthly monitoring of whether these forms are duly stamped; 
and, in cases when they are not, the NGOs have to check whether there are justifications for 
non-compliance according to the programme’s rules (e.g., sickness, death of a family member 
or natural disasters are all justifiable absences from school, health check-ups or family training 
sessions). Only unjustified non-compliance is reported and generates discounts in the transfers. 
The discounting of benefits also differs by programme. In El Salvador, the education 
stipend is temporarily suspended if there are at least four unjustified absences from school  
in a month by any beneficiary children. The health stipend is suspended in case of a one-off 
simultaneous non-compliance with both the health check-ups and immunizations or non-
compliance with either the check-up scheme or the immunizations protocol for two periods.33  
In Paraguay, discounts vary between Gs 15,000 (US$ 3 PPP) and Gs 30,000 (US$ 5) per 
child, depending on the co-responsibility (education and health check-ups for 6-14 year-olds, 
in the first case; and health check-ups for children 0-5 year-olds and pregnant women, in the 
second case). Non-compliance three consecutive times leads to the suspension of transfers.  
4.3  COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND GENDER 
Following the example of most CCTs implemented elsewhere, Red Solidaria and Tekoporã deliver 
transfers to the mother or another female family member who is in charge of children’s care. This 
gender concern is strengthened in Red Solidaria’s family training sessions, which include specific 
workshops related to gender awareness, reproductive health and women’s rights.  
The beneficiary women of Tekoporã elect leaders (madres líderes) to function as a liaison 
with the programme. These leaders receive no monetary compensation for their work, which 
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for the existence of beneficiary (community) committees whose main objective is to develop 
production cooperatives,34 seems to be linked to the idea of enforcing a culture of self-help 
and promotion of empowerment. However, while having these participatory dimensions could 
effectively result in greater awareness and organization regarding rights-based demands on 
the part of beneficiaries, their actual scope is restricted to topics directly related to the 
programme. This seems an opportunity missed in terms of community organization and 
gender empowerment. 
Red Solidaria also includes a beneficiary or community committee in its design, which 
should comprise at least three beneficiaries by canton who function as liaisons between the 
community, the municipal committee and the NGO responsible for family support and follow-
up. Their roles are similar to those assumed by the Tekoporã’s madres líderes. However, as yet 
these committees have not been set up in most communities. 
The community is also supposed to have a presence in the municipal committees of Red 
Solidaria through the attendance of community leaders representing each rural canton of that 
municipality. But the actual degree of participation by these leaders varies by committee. In 
some cases, it is difficult even to ensure their presence in the meetings, since they have to 
cover long distances, usually on foot, and lose a day’s work to attend the committee sessions, 
with no compensation or other incentives. And it is not clear the extent to which the 
community leaders included in the committees indeed represent beneficiaries. A common 
feature observed among these leaders is that most of them are males. This might indicate the 
prevalence of a cultural gender bias in their choice.  
Thus, although the discourse about community participation seems, in general, very 
strong among CCTs, in practice there are shortcomings in both of the programmes. 
Beneficiaries do not take advantage of the opportunities to use the participatory spheres 
created by Tekoporã; and genuine beneficiary and community participation in Red Solidaria 
still has to be realized. 
5  ADMINISTRATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS 
5.1  NATIONAL AND LOCAL COORDINATION 
Both Tekoporã and Red Solidaria are national programmes whose implementation depends on 
fine-tuned coordination between national and local levels of administration. The lack of 
institutional structures at the local level that would be able to reach potential beneficiaries  
and a lack of coordination between national and local government structures are usually 
suggested as major constraints on the implementation of CCT programmes in countries 
without an established tradition of social protection. Red Solidaria and Tekoporã have been 
very creative in the design of this coordination and have found innovative solutions that 
deserve to be further evaluated. 
Red Solidaria opted to use an existing structure, the Social Investment Fund for  
Local Development35 (FISDL), as the implementing agency, but its technical and political 
coordination falls under the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency and a Directive Council 
involving several government organizations at ministerial level. This Council is supposed to 
meet twice a month and has the role of ensuring the strategic coordination required for the 
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The technical coordination is the responsibility of an Executive Directorate, which 
coordinates with FISDL and the government organizations involved in the Red. The Executive 
Directorate has a very modest structure (four employees plus the Executive Director) and  
is hierarchically linked to the Presidency, although physically located in FISDL. The inter-
institutional coordination required at this level takes place in an Intersectoral Committee, in 
which the organizations represented at the Directive Council have a seat. 
The core focal points for Red Solidaria at the local level consist of the local representative 
of FISDL, who is responsible in general for no more than two municipalities where the Red is 
being implemented; a municipal liaison, who is usually the mayor; and the municipal and 
regional coordinators of the NGO in charge of the family support and follow-up in the locality. 
The NGOs are hired annually by FISDL through a bidding process for the implementation of 
the CCT component in each municipality. Currently, there are five NGOs working with the first 
32 municipalities included in the programme. They have a regional coordinator, as well as a 
municipal coordinator and a team of young  promoters, usually recruited locally, who are each 
responsible for working with 150-160 households.  
In practice, the NGOs are the link between beneficiaries and the programme. They are in 
charge of organizing incorporation events for the signing of family agreements, monitoring the 
compliance of co-responsibilities, providing lifelong learning sessions for beneficiary families, 
coordinating (along with the FISDL local representative) payment events, receiving 
complaints, and administering and updating the information that is required for the 
beneficiary registry system.  
Tekoporã is a programme of the Red de Promoción y Protección Social, RPPS36 (Social 
Protection and Promotion Network). The Red is the implementing agency of Tekoporã and is  
a department of the Secretary for Social Action (SAS). The Unidad Coordinadora Institucional,  
UCI (Institutional Coordinating Unit), which is under the RPPS, is in charge of the operational 
aspects of the programme. However, the intersectoral coordination is carried out by the 
Gabinete Social (Social Cabinet), which facilitates the interaction between the SAS and the 
other Ministries, particularly the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Health. 
The Minister of Education is the head of the Gabinete Social.  
Until 2006, the programme was fully financed by the country’s budget resources, but  
the scaling up will be financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) through the 
reallocation of the funds of a loan that was agreed and signed in January 2003 to finance 
PROPAIS II (Paraguayan Program of Social Investments). This new funding alternative was 
possible because the terms of the PROPAIS II agreement had envisaged the financing of a CCT 
programme as one of its potential social investments.  
At the local level there are representatives, such as the departmental supervisor, the 
municipal liaison—whose wage is partially financed by the programme—and the family 
guides. The departmental supervisor is a person hired by the programme to act as the focal 
point between the Institutional Coordinating Unit and the other institutions involved in the 
implementation of the programme, in particular, directors of health centres and departmental 
education supervisors, the municipal liaison, the reviewing committee and the family guides.  
The guides are responsible for the family support and follow-up of the beneficiary 
families. The work of the departmental supervisor in Tekoporã is a mixture of what the FISDL 
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other functions, the supervisors are supposed to oversee the activities of the family guides, 
who, just like the local promoters in Red Solidaria, are the direct link between beneficiary 
families and the programme. The family guides are young people who live in the municipality 
and have at least a high-school education and some experience in social work. They are 
responsible for 80 to 100 families—fewer than in Red Solidaria—whom they have to visit at 
least once a month. These guides are selected, trained and hired by the Institutional 
Coordinating Unit (UCI). 
5.2  LINKAGES AMONG GOVERNMENT LAYERS 
Municipalities get formally involved in both programmes through the signing of an agreement 
with the national government. This involves the appointment of a municipal liaison for the 
programme. The municipal liaison, as already mentioned, is usually the mayor or another 
employee or elected representative that is appointed by the mayor for this task in the case of 
Red Solidaria. His/her cost is borne by the municipality. In the case of Tekoporã, the liaison is 
a person nominated by the mayor and whose wage is partially (sometimes fully) covered by the 
programme. Ideally, the liaison should be an employee of the municipality who would receive a 
wage increase—financed by UCI—to compensate for the new tasks related to the programme. 
The municipal liaison involvement’s with the Red covers its three components and is an 
add-on function for the person, for which there is no specific remuneration or incentive. 
However, the fact that the Red components will not only increase the amount of cash that  
can stimulate the local economy but also finance infrastructure improvements in the locality 
operates as a major incentive to get the Salvadorian municipalities involved.  
In Tekoporã, the agreement states that the UCI and the municipality will share information 
on the programme as a way to harmonize their initiatives for the benefit of the activities.  
It also states that an operational plan should be worked out by both parties. Among the 
municipalities’ duties listed in the agreement are: the nomination of the local liaison; the 
provision of support (infrastructure) to the different activities that will be carried out at the 
municipality level (e.g., training sessions, census activities, registrations, benefit payments, 
monitoring and evaluation, and controlling of conditionalities); and, finally, some financial 
support to (unspecified) activities related to the programme.  
During in-situ visits to pilot municipalities and based on interviews with mayors and 
liaisons, we observed that the municipalities do approve of the programme because of the 
benefits that it brings to the poorest people in the community and the stimulus that it 
provides to the local economy. However, the level of commitment varies greatly among pilot 
municipalities. In some of them, there is interest to link local initiatives to the programme, such 
as a social pharmacy in the district of Buena Vista, but this is not the rule.  
Actually, in most cases the agreement to work together with the UCI to improve the 
coordination of programmes that would combat poverty seems to be only on paper. No 
mention was made during the interviews of any common operational plan linking the 
programme components to municipal initiatives. There has been some discussion  
about municipal support to the family guides, such as providing them with access  
to free photocopies at the municipality and a monthly fuel quota to subsidize their  
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The government layers actively involved in the programme are thus limited to  
the national government and the local government. There is no established role for the 
departmental government. In the case of Tekoporã, the 2004 operational manual included 
some activities for a departmental liaison in the implementation of the programme. However, 
this liaison was never set up and the introduction of the departmental supervisors directly 
linked to the UCI has filled that gap one year after the launching of the pilot. 
5.3  GOVERNMENT COORDINATION, SUPPLY SIDE ASPECTS AND EXIT DOORS 
Red Solidaria was launched in El Salvador as part of the government’s social strategy, 
Oportunidades. This strategy is described as an effort to develop capabilities and opportunities 
for social and economic inclusion. In addition to Red Solidaria, which is targeted at the poorest 
rural population, Oportunidades covers four other strategic areas: health (Fosalud), youth 
(Jóvenes), information technology (Conéctate) and credit (Tu Credito). But the way that these 
five programmes interact is not self-evident. Apparently, there is no direct coordination among 
them, with the exception of the micro-credit projects that form part of the Red’s component of 
family sustainability. The five of them seem to have been grouped together more because of 
the presidential priority they have received than as part of a well articulated social strategy. 
Nevertheless, one can argue that Red Solidaria does achieve an important intersectoral 
coordination with the areas of education and health, particularly at the national level. The 
Ministries of Health and Education have taken part in the programme since its design, 
including the formulation of the logical framework, the definition of co-responsibilities  
and the identification of follow-up mechanisms.  
In the implementation phase, they are important partners in the supply-side efforts that 
have to be linked with a CCT-like programme: the Extension of Health Services (ESS) and 
Effective Schools Networks (REE) have been targeted to the same municipalities reached by 
the Red.38 And these ministries are also involved in the impact evaluation planned to start in 
2007. This coordination takes place not only at the political level, through the Red’s Directive 
Council, but also at the technical level, through the Intersectoral Committee.  
Moreover, the Red goes beyond simply establishing add-on responsibilities for the health 
and education personnel as a result of its CCT component. It directs additional resources for 
strengthening education and health infrastructure through its second component. So, the Red 
was not intended to be only an additional burden on, or a reorientation of, line ministries’ 
funds for these areas. It implied an infusion of new funds and a potentially greater impact for 
the ministries’ own programmes. 
Nevertheless, even with such coordination and the integrated design of Red Solidaria, 
there have been supply-side constraints on the programme. For instance, newspaper articles 
have pointed out that the beginning of the school year in which the Red was introduced in its 
first 15 targeted municipalities was marked by shortages of classrooms, equipment and 
teachers that could respond to the increases in enrolment resulting from the programme.  
Officials of the Ministry of Education have confirmed these difficulties, but pointed out that 
they are commonly observed in many urban schools of the country. The novelty was that it 
happened in poor and remote rural areas, often previously ‘invisible’, and that it had to be 
quickly solved so as to avoid jeopardizing the programme’s co-responsibilities. In this sense, 
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program such as the Red Solidaria, might work as positive pressures for the expansion of service 
coverage and help motivate the population to access basic rights to which they are entitled.  
An important issue, which does not appear as a specific education sector programme 
linked to the Red, is school transportation. Since most of the Red’s beneficiaries are located  
in rural areas, often uncovered by public transportation and having inadequate roads,  
school distance can be a serious obstacle to children’s attendance. Apparently, each school  
network selected on the basis of the REE programme could use part of its funding to set up 
transportation schemes, but there is no national programme that adequately addresses this 
potential supply-side constraint. Moreover, REE funds might not be sufficient to provide an 
appropriate solution. 
In the health sector, the increases in demand resulting from Red Solidaria also required 
measures to hire more doctors and nurses and find other ‘creative’ approaches, such as 
directing to the Red’s municipalities medical students that are fulfilling their one-year social 
service requirements. What remains to be further investigated is whether these responses  
are more than mere improvisations that attend to the immediate objective of ensuring that 
the beneficiaries comply with the programme’s co-responsibilities, and thus help offer 
beneficiaries sustainable access to quality public services in education and health. 
At the municipal level, the linking of service providers with Red Solidaria is related mostly 
to feeding the information flow related to the verification of co-responsibilities, which is 
monitored by the NGOs for family support and follow-up. In the case of the service providers 
visited during the research fieldwork, we found that the degree of familiarity with the 
programme appeared higher among health personnel than education personnel. This could 
be related to the fact that the director of the municipal health unit has a seat in the municipal 
committee, while the education representative comes from the departmental level.  
The coordination between the CCT component and the family sustainability component 
of the Red is less visible. Red Solidaria’s productive projects are coordinated by the Ministry  
of Agriculture while micro-credit is under the responsibility of the Multi-Sectoral Investment 
Bank. Although these initiatives might coincide in terms of geographical targeting, because of 
their own specific eligibility requirements and criteria, their beneficiaries are not necessarily 
the same households that receive the cash transfers.  
Furthermore, the productive component of the Red appears to be the most fragile one, in 
terms of resources. The reason for this might relate to the weak emphasis on promoting ‘exit 
doors’ for the CCT component that are not demographically based. Another possibility, 
mentioned during an interview, is that building infrastructure is more visible and less complex 
than promoting time-intensive productive projects that can really make an impact. 
Tekoporã is also part of a broader strategy: the National Strategy for Fighting Poverty.  
The objective of this Strategy is to guarantee to all citizens living in poverty the access to the 
material, social and political conditions needed to exercise their rights and develop their 
potentialities in a comprehensive manner, and to thereby halt a self-reinforcing cycle of 
poverty. For this purpose, the Strategy deems it necessary to institute a new public 
management that focuses on the intersectoral coordination of public policies in order  
to offer a comprehensive set of public services to the population living in poverty.  
The Secretary for Social Action (SAS) is the institution responsible for this articulation. 
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comprised of programmes that seek to attend to the basic needs of vulnerable families;  
2) Social Promotion: comprised of programmes that address social exclusion via the promotion 
of communitarian organizations and communitarian services and infrastructure, and the 
strengthening of local governments; and 3) Economic Inclusion: comprised of programmes 
that guarantee financial and technical support to improve the quality and the productivity of 
small firms, including the development of inclusive networks with a large social base; and 
provide training programmes 
The main feature of the intersectoral strategy is its orientation towards a specific target 
population, namely, the poor. To this end, adequate targeting instruments, objective selection 
of beneficiaries and monitoring and evaluation are crucial elements for success. The tools used 
and discussed in the targeting strategy of Tekoporã—i.e., IPG and ICV—are going to be used in 
the intersectoral initiative as well. It is clear, therefore, that the inclusion of Tekoporã 
beneficiaries into the three components of the Strategy is a fundamental step in the 
implementation of that Strategy.  
However, if the Secretary for Social Action (SAS) is the institution responsible for 
guaranteeing the access of the Tekoporã beneficiaries to their rights, it is not in charge of the 
supply of education and health inputs as well as other inputs necessary to promote social and 
economic inclusion. Actually, the institution responsible for designing and coordinating social 
programmes is the Gabinete Social (Social Cabinet). Therefore, when the Institutional 
Coordinating Unit (UCI) alerts the SAS that it is facing supply problems that hinder beneficiary 
families from complying with conditionalities, the next step is to contact the line ministry 
responsible and/or the Gabinete Social to solve that problem. However, an analysis of the pilot 
experience of Tekoporã reveals that this route is not a smooth one. 
The line ministries—particularly in the areas of education and health—did not take part in 
the design of Tekoporã. This has proven to be a major issue that has led to the difficulties in 
getting the liaison personnel of each line ministry involved in the implementation of the 
programme. This was particularly the case in the Ministry of Health, where the liaison 
designated to be the link between the programme and the Ministry changed several times, 
delaying the achievement of a consensus on the usefulness of health conditionalities and the 
role that health personnel at the local level would have in monitoring them.  
It is worth mentioning that there was some expectation that the extra burden occasioned 
by the new programme, due to its monitoring tasks, would lead to some sort of financial 
compensation for the personnel involved. The absence of a specific budget for the 
infrastructure investment in the areas of health and education—in contrast to the experience 
of Red Solidaria—was another hurdle hindering the implementation of the programme, at 
least in the pilot phase.  
In June 2006, the Gabinete Social signed an agreement in which it committed to  
1) improve the supply of services under the responsibility of line ministries in all municipalities 
that take part in the Tekoporã programme so that the conditionalities could be effectively 
fulfilled; 2) increase the budget directed to the municipalities covered by the programme in 
order to respond to the new demand that it would generate, through earmarked money  
to improve infrastructure and increase human resources; 3) speed up a social protection 
intersectoral plan to offer complementary programmes for the vulnerable population; and  
4) nominate a committee that would be responsible for verifying that the commitments above 
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The need for the Gabinete Social to issue such an agreement almost one year after the 
pilot had started is a clear indication that the necessary intersectoral coordination of the 
programme had not been in place. A thorough evaluation of the El Salvador experience has 
not been undertaken so far but, in principle, one could highlight as a potential best practice 
the El Salvador experience with the incorporation of line ministries in the design process and 
the introduction of a specific budget to address the supply-side constraints. These practices 
can facilitate the coordination of the work between the implementing agency of the 
programmes and the line ministries at the national and local levels. 
The inclusion of the ‘family social support’ component in the Tekoporã was done during 
the implementation of the pilot. This component had not been mentioned in the 2004 
operational manual. Based on the review of documents and interviews with managers, we 
concluded that this component was introduced basically for two reasons: 1) a perception that 
the cash transfer would not be enough to improve other dimensions of well being in the 
household—in particular, it would not be able to move the household out of (extreme) 
poverty within the span of three years; and 2) the lack of local institutions that could effectively 
link up the programme with beneficiaries. It would be an impossible task for the municipal 
liaison to be the focal point for more than 1,000 families; therefore, the decision to include 
family guides in the family support component was a logical one.  
Whereas the component of family sustainability in Red Solidaria is perceived as an exit 
door strategy (even if it does not take a very prominent role in the programme), in Tekoporã 
the exit door strategy is based on the work undertaken by the family guides, namely, the so 
called ‘family social support’. The family guides have a variety of tasks that range from the 
actual support given to the families to the collection of data to verify the progress of the family 
with regard to co-responsibilities and complementary activities.  
During in-situ visits and interviews with members of the communities, we could observe 
that much of the emphasis of the programme is placed on the role of the social support 
provided by the family guides. In fact, sometimes their work is regarded by community 
members (headmasters, members of the reviewing committee, local informants) as being 
more important than the transfers themselves or than the conditionalities related to education 
and health. According to the family guides interviewed in our field visits, the bulk of their 
activities consist in discussing and planning with families a strategy to increase their 
productive potential. 
In general, the family guides encourage the families to cultivate vegetables and fruits  
and raise livestock for self-consumption and a marketable surplus, motivate domestic budget 
planning, and encourage the creation of beneficiary (community) committees that would work 
like a production cooperative. The latter have led mostly to the production of soap and chipas, 
based on a notable gender division of labour, as mentioned earlier.  
In addition to the contribution of the committees, sometimes the lifelong learning sessions 
incorporate some elements related to productive activities. The family guides also discuss the 
importance of health care, hygiene, education and an appropriate and varied diet for the welfare 
of the family in general, and of the children, in particular. They are also in charge of dealing with 
domestic violence and family problems such as alcoholism and drug abuse. Fábio Veras Soares  and  Tatiana Britto  25 
 
According to the phases that the families should follow in the three-year period, the 
family guides would work and assess the following dimensions: 
1.  First phase (6 months): the co-responsibilities for health and education and 
complementary activities related to identification (getting IDs), a healthy  
diet and hygiene; 
2.  Second phase (12 months): co-responsibilities in health and education and 
complementary activities related to a healthy diet and hygiene; plus income 
generating activities, self-consumption and production; literacy and training  
for labour activities; 
3.  Third phase (12 months): co-responsibilities in health and education and 
complementary activities related to hygiene; income generating activities,  
self-consumption and production; literacy and training for labour activities;  
plus family dynamics; 
4.  Fourth phase (6 months): co-responsibilities in health and education and 
complementary activities related to hygiene; income generating activities,  
self-consumption and production; and family dynamics. 
 
Some of the productive activities mentioned above could improve the welfare of the 
families, but it is doubtful that they would be adequate to lift beneficiaries out of poverty 
without being integrated with a broader set of policies. Initiatives in this direction have been 
taken. For instance, it was mentioned in one of the in-situ visits that the Ministry of 
Agriculture had tried to give technical assistance to the beneficiaries, but a major hurdle is 
the fact that they are used to work with farmers who own much more land than the typical 
Tekoporã beneficiaries. For the latter, a six hectare plot seems to be the upper limit of land 
possession or access.39  
The lack of technology and appropriate policies to deal with such constraints seems to be 
a major problem that hinders getting other ministries involved in the programme, even 
leaving aside the issue of coordinating a broader set of ministries and institutions. This 
highlights the difficulties in coordinating social protection, social promotion and economic 
inclusion in a single programme. In this sense, a challenge for Tekoporã managers is to make its 
objectives clear to participants and civil society at the grassroots level so that beneficiaries will 
not expect from the programme more than it can (and should) offer.  
6  CONCLUSION: BOTTLENECKS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
In this Working Paper, we have discussed the potential conflicts that can arise from the double 
objectives of CCT programmes—i.e., alleviate poverty in the short run and break the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty in the long run. These conflicts affect several dimensions: 
targeting strategy, implementation of conditionalities, graduation rules, institutional 
coordination, and exit doors. The experiences of El Salvador and Paraguay with regard to these 
dimensions are illustrative of the challenges posed by the implementation of CCT programmes 
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Financial constraints are a great challenge since they determine the size of the 
programme (e.g., how many beneficiaries it can cover) and its scope (e.g., which 
complementary activities the programme can afford). We have seen that neither Red Solidaria 
nor Tekoporã aims to cover all extremely poor households in their respective countries.40 The 
size and scope of each programme also tend to pose trade-offs. Introducing family support 
activities, for instance, clearly diverts funds from the cash transfer component. In this regard, 
we have observed that while the focus of Red Solidaria remains on human capital 
accumulation (the Family Sustainability Network component does not have the same priority 
as the cash transfer component), Tekoporã has smoothly shifted its focus towards the activities 
related to family social support. 
However, such options do not always seem to be the result of a conscious decision in one 
direction or another. We have seen, for example, that neither Red Solidaria nor Tekoporã opted 
for targeting criteria that would give more weight to variables that determine human capital 
outcomes. Actually both adopted a targeting strategy based on poverty measures that 
emphasize short-term poverty relief.  
Another example of a tension that results from the effort to achieve the double objectives 
under conditions of capacity constraints is Red Solidaria’s limiting of grants—despite its focus 
on human capital accumulation—to families with children who have not completed 6th grade 
and with at least one child younger than 15 years old. The programme ‘graduates’ households 
with just one child when she turns 15 years old even though she has not completed 6th grade.  
These restrictions contradict the goal of ensuring at least basic education to all and might, 
in fact, generate negative incentives for grade promotion among students who do not have 
relevant age/grade ratios. In the absence of episodes of repetition or dropping-out, students 
would reach the 6th grade at the age of 12 years, not 15.41 In Tekoporã, where there has been a 
shift away from human capital accumulation, a child can stay in the programme—which is very 
important because the value of the benefit varies with the number of children—until she 
completes the basic education cycle (up to the 9th grade) regardless of her age. Therefore, as 
long as exit rules are based on appropriate age/grade criteria, Tekoporã’s approach seems to 
be more supportive of human capital outcomes.  
Nevertheless, the uncertainties surrounding graduation rules and how these rules fit with 
the objectives of the programme are a crucial challenge for both programmes. From the 
perspective of human capital accumulation, a period of three years in the programme is too 
short for any sustainable impact. It remains to be seen whether these two countries will follow 
the Colombian experience, where this limit is not observed, or will come up with more 
coherent graduation rules or phasing out strategies.  
With regard to managing conditionalities, Tekoporã has not monitored the co-
responsibilities in the first year and a half of the pilot programme. This has basically been  
due to the lack of institutional coordination among line ministries and the implementing 
agency. This has led to an agreement by the Social Cabinet to channel more resources into  
the municipalities covered by the programme and strengthen the coordination among 
ministries to tackle both supply-side constraints and the monitoring of conditionalities.  
The family guides will have a prominent role in the process of speeding up the 
collection of information on compliance with conditionalities, in order, in part, to determine 
any necessary discounts in the value of transfers. These new measures taken by Tekoporã Fábio Veras Soares  and  Tatiana Britto  27 
 
resemble the ones already in place in Red Solidaria, where line ministries have been  
involved since the very beginning of the programme and conditionalities are closely 
monitored through an active participation of the NGOs responsible for the follow-up  
with beneficiary families. 
In addition to the coordination among line ministries, there is the important issue of 
coordination among different layers of government. The role of municipalities, beyond the 
nomination of local liaisons, is still not clear. Municipalities sign an agreement with the 
programme implementing agency from the national government, but in practice their 
participation seems to be very limited. It is not clear whether this is caused by a lack of 
resources or political will. Similarly, there is little coordination at the local level among  
the respective institutions of the various line ministries (mainly the education and health 
ministries), the municipalities, and the representatives of the programme.  
In Paraguay, the absence of a minimal official structure at the grassroots level that could 
link the programme with beneficiaries led to the introduction of family guides. In El Salvador 
the NGOs play a similar role. This lack of institutional capacity at the local level, in addition to 
being a problem on its own, puts pressure on the funding of the programme. Establishing such 
capacity tends to drain resources from the cash transfer component, and this might lead to a 
reduction in the target number of beneficiary families. An issue that deserves a deeper analysis 
is the cost of these new structures vis-à-vis the total size of the programme and their efficacy in 
helping compliance with responsibilities.42 
In addition to monitoring conditionalities and linking up the programme with 
beneficiaries, Tekoporã’s family guides are in charge of the family support component, which is 
regarded as an exit strategy from the programme. However, this initiative, which resembles 
the Puente/Chile Solidario model (a popular approach in many new CCTs), could backfire for the 
simple reason that most of the programmes and policies available in a country such as Chile 
are likely to be absent in poorer countries.  
In Red Solidaria, the Family Sustainability Network seems to serve the purpose of 
providing an exit strategy for the beneficiaries through providing income generating activities. 
However, it does not operate on the assumption that the beneficiaries of micro-credit 
initiatives are also beneficiary families of the cash transfer component. Such a link would imply 
a higher degree of coordination between the implementing agency and other ministries, such 
as the Ministry of Agriculture, which are not the usual CCT line ministries. This process would 
add a new layer of institutional coordination for programmes that are still struggling to get the 
basics right. 
It seems that the demand for these exit strategies results from the uneasiness of  
some sectors of society in accepting that it may be necessary to hand out money to poor 
households for an extended period of time, namely, until their children complete their basic 
education cycles. In order to respond to this concern, programme managers have tended  
to design, in a fairly rapid manner, exit-door strategies that are not likely to work in a time 
span of only three years or are not well adapted to the concrete needs and problems of 
beneficiaries. Therefore, instead of reducing the tension between the two original objectives 
of CCT programmes, the addition of this new demand can further complicate programmes, 
exacerbating contradictions between the two objectives and substantially changing the 
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Another important issue, where the political will for implementing CCTs plays a decisive 
role, is whether CCTs are considered temporary policies put in place to impact upon one 
generation or a permanent component of a country’s social protection system, aiming to 
protect those who are traditionally excluded from conventional social programmes and 
contributory safety nets.  
In practice, this issue is resolved by the static or dynamic design of the CCT programme, 
i.e., whether it has a strategy to incorporate new beneficiaries. Both Tekoporã and Red Solidaria 
have adopted a static approach—in contrast with Oportunidades (Mexico), Bolsa Familia 
(Brazil) and Puentes/Chile Solidario (Chile), which have a dynamic approach that incorporates 
new beneficiaries every year. Budget constraints and the need for political support from the 
elites and middle classes—the influential voters who are not potential beneficiaries—are likely 
to determine whether such programmes remain static or become dynamic.  
In summary, we have seen that political economy factors affecting the concrete evolution 
of CCT programmes in such countries as El Salvador and Paraguay, which face financial and 
institutional capacity constraints, might shift such programmes away from their two original 
objectives and/or generate greater contradictions or tensions between them. Such changes do 
not always move in the same direction:  some components might be weakened while other 
components might be added in order to respond to the criticisms faced by the programme.  
At the end of the day, most of the criticism is based on the idea that cash transfers to the 
poor are not really a good model of social protection, even when transfers are tied to 
conditionalities. Perhaps, a larger research question to be answered regarding the political 
economy of CCT programmes, but one that is beyond the scope of this study is: who is 
opposed to cash transfer programmes and what is their rationale? 
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1. Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico has been evaluated along several dimensions by different external evaluation 
teams. This process has generated much of the evidence that has informed most of the international discussion 
regarding CCT impacts. These evaluations can be found at <http://evaluacion.oportunidades.gob.mx:8010/en/ 
index.php>. With regard to the Brazilian experience, small-scale evaluations of the first decentralized experiences 
with CCTs at municipal and state level yielded evidence-based support for those programmes so that the national 
government decided to run CCT programmes at the country-level. This process culminated in the creation of Bolsa 
Familia in 2003 through the merger of different CCT programmes. 
2. Similarly, a social protection strategy that does not incorporate the typical CCT beneficiary cannot be regarded as 
comprehensive. In fact, the great novelty of CCT programmes in most Latin American countries is not the 
conditionalities and the potential effect of human capital accumulation, as it is commonly pointed out, but rather 
the fact that a significant proportion of the poorest population is included for the first time in some sort of social 
protection scheme.  
3. Some CCT programmes have adopted a different approach towards conditionalities. Brazil´s Bolsa Familia, for 
instance, a approaches conditionalities as mechanisms to ensure the access of the poor to basic rights such as 
education and health, rather than as measuresm with which beneficiaries must comply in orderto continue in 
the programme.  
4. It is worth noting that Familias en Acción in Colombia had a three-year limit for families to stay in the programme, 
but this limit was never observed (Nuñez & Cuesta, 2006). It remains to be seen whether countries with financial 
and institutional capacity constraints that have recently started CCT programmes really ‘need’ the three-year limit 
due to budget constraints or they are using this limit to buy time to consolidate and structure the programme, win 
political support, and then replace this time limit with an age or grade eligibility standard. 
5. Puente-Chile Solidario also claims, as does Bolsa Familia, that it has a focus on guaranteeing the fulfilment of basic 
rights. In the case of the Chilean programme, the most important basic right to be achieved is the right to have 
access to food (derecho a la alimentación). This is due to the programme’s targeting of the extremely poor. Once 
this right is secured through the transfers, one can advance towards an approach of ‘capacity development’ 
through psycho-social support that helps the families to achieve a minimum standard in several dimensions of 
well-being (Cohen & Villatoro, 2006). 
6. Nevertheless, there is a risk that in over-emphasizing exit-doors or self-help strategies, the programmes end 
up imposing add-on conditionalities on beneficiaries, as well as causing exclusionary effects on groups that are 
unable to work. 
7. Interestingly, the government plan of the leftist Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)—the 
other strong contesting party in the 2004 elections—mentioned under its educational priorities the establishment 
of school grants (beca escola) to combat school drop-outs, low rates of attendance in school, and child labour. 
Therefore, it seems that by 2003 cash transfers for human capital purposes had already emerged as a ‘consensus’ 
between the two strongest parties, at least at the programmatic level. 
8. Executive Decree no. 11, of March 4th, 2005, modified by Executive Decree no. 42, of May 16th, 2005. 
9. This initiative started in December 2000 and involved national and international experts and the support of the 
IDB, World Bank, ILO and UNDP. 
10. Tekoporã has two operational manuals: one written in 2004 for the preparation of the pilot and another one 
that is being finalized for a loan agreement with the IDB. The latter—which we will refer to as the 2007 operational 
manual—incorporates all changes that occurred during the implementation of the pilot as well as some changes 
suggested by IDB negotiators. 
11. The latest version of the 2007 operational manual—still to be approved (and confirmed) - has significantly 
changed these objectives. Now there is a clear emphasis on the component linked to the social support 
provided to the family. The general objective is stated as improving the quality of life of the beneficiaries 
through the use of basic services and instruction in good practices in health and education. The specific 
objectives are (1) to increase the resources of the household through the transfer and (2) to give family social 
support through following-up co-responsibilities.  
12. These criteria were not detailed in the programme’s operational manual, but in the new operational guideline 
for the municipal committees, which is still in the process of being publicized among committee members. 
13. During the interviews carried out with the programme’s managers, it was mentioned that the use of the proxy-
means test, at least in its initial formulation, was not assured. Further tests with the formula and other targeting 
alternatives were to be conducted with the beneficiary database so as to confirm the validity and applicability of 
the targeting. 
14. The IPG ranks the poorest districts in the country based on data from the 2002 Census data and the 2003 
National Household Survey—Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH). Following a poverty map approach, the 
programme uses the data of the EPH to calculate poverty statistics at the district level. 
  
 
15. This formula has been changed after the pilot of Tekoporã. The IPG now ranks 66 municipalities that will be 
given priority not only for the implementation of the CCT programme but also for other development and poverty-
reduction initiatives.  
16. Illustrative of this approach is the fact that among the 20 districts that had an IPG score above 20 points, only 
Buena Vista was selected to be one of the five districts to take part in the pilot. 
17. This restriction was already present in the 2004 operational manual and its enforcement was confirmed by the 
analysis of the documentation of the programme and interviews with programme managers.  
18. The IDB has suggested that Tekoporã should adopt a proxy means test based on the same set of variables used 
to calculate the ICV as its selection criteria. According to the latest version of the operational manual, households in 
ICV group II will become beneficiaries only if they are also below the extreme poverty line. It is unclear, however, 
whether their earnings will be self-reported or estimated through a proxy means approach. 
19. It seems that this component will not be part of the 2007 operational manual. There will be a period of 20 days 
during which families can report that they have not been contacted by the census enumerators. Once the census is 
completed, new families cannot be added to the database of potential beneficiaries. 
20. This problem will not occur in the scaling up of the programme since, according to the 2007 operational 
manual, only households in rural areas will be eligible for the programme. 
21. But, in general, this work is done by the implementing agency’s local representative for that municipality  
or the municipal liaison to the programme. 
22. Calculations on the basis of the statistics presented in the poverty map show that poverty rates vary from  
66 per cent to 89 per cent within the 32 municipalities of the first cluster (FLACSO, 2005). 
23. In a sense, the family sustainability component of Red Solidaria seems to have been put in place to deal with 
this issue, since it encompasses productive projects and micro-credit schemes as mechanisms for income 
generation or diversification. However, as will be discussed below, this component has not received much 
attention in the programme and its links with the CCT component are weak. 
24. The 2004 operational manual mentioned that the re-assessment of the poverty status of the family would be 
based on the ICV. This was reviewed based on the recognition that the ICV score of the family would hardly change 
because the structural variables that comprise this index are fairly stable. 
25. More details on the work and duties of family guides will be provided in the next section. 
26. It is still unclear how this family progress assessment will take place. 
27. Actually, some of the family guides use the possibility of staying longer than three years in the programme as an 
incentive for the families to engage in the complementary activities. This strategy is not endorsed by the managers at 
the national level, but this practice is fairly widespread among family guides in the pilot municipalities. 
28. An exception seems to be Bolsa Familia in Brazil, which has no time limit for staying in the programme but uses 
the single registry as an updating mechanism and consistency check for the verification of family eligibility for the 
programme. Information in the single registry has to be updated every two years. 
29. It is striking that this mechanism has been created only six years after the launch of Progresa in 1997.  
The human capital approach of this programme and the impact evaluations that did not show any negative  
effect on adult labour supply have helped it to somehow avoid the hotly contested discussions and pressures 
surrounding the issue of the graduation of beneficiary families in the short/medium run in order to avoid their 
dependence on transfers. 
30. In the new operational manual, the government does not promise to pay the benefit monthly, but states only 
that the beneficiary will receive 36 payments over a three-year period. 
31. In fact, even in countries that have been running CCTs the longest, the actual monitoring of conditionalites 
does not always take place and reactions to non-compliance are seldom implemented. This points out the issue 
that the actual set up and implementation of such a monitoring system might take a long time. 
32. Details on the role of NGOs in Red Solidaria will be discussed below. 
33. The health protocols include scheduled check-ups and immunizations according to intervals that vary by the 
age of children. 
34. We will discuss the beneficiary (community) committees’ objectives in the next section. However, it is worth 
mentioning that women are over-represented in those committees. It seems extremely difficult to get the men 
involved. Apparently, there is a perception among beneficiary households that any activity related to the 
programme should be undertaken by the titular, i.e., the mother or the woman who collects the benefit. Not 
surprisingly, most beneficiary committees produce chipas (a type of maize bread) and soap, both of which are 
traditionally regarded as female activities. 
35. FISDL is the successor of the original Social Investment Fund (FIS), created in the early 1990s with the 
development agenda of that time, i.e., a temporary mandate, a focus on infrastructure projects, a demand-based 
orientation and a heavy reliance on external resources. Throughout the 1990s, the fund achieved a permanent 
status and underwent several transformations. Since 1997, its mission has been the “eradication of poverty in El 
  
 
Salvador” and its mandate has included a strong component of local development and coordiantion with 
municipal governments. FISDL’s history, mandate and nation-wide network, through its 44 local representatives, 
justified appointing it as the implementing agency of Red Solidaria. 
36. Under the RPPS there are two other programmes: a) Abrazo, whose target are street children living in Asunción 
(the capital) and b) Ñopytyvo, which is quite similar to Tekoporã but is targeted to the indigenous population of 
Puerto Casado.  
37. Family guides have to bear the cost of transportation to visit the families under their responsibility. Most guides 
have motorcycles. 
38. Both programmes existed before the creation of Red Solidaria. ESS was mostly a World Bank funded project, 
which included the creation of mobile health units and the contracting of private health providers to reach remote 
communities. REE is oriented towards increasing coverage and quality through the coordination of schools located 
in the same geographical area. 
39. The data of the impact evaluation survey show that 75 per cent of the beneficiaries have access to less than six 
hectares and, actually, cultivate less than that. 
40. In the case of Tekoporã, the target number of beneficiaries has been reduced to 28 per cent of the original goal. 
41. Supply constraints have been pointed out as the main reason for these restrictions. Therefore, strengthening 
the delivery of basic education beyond 6th grade in the targeted municipalities is very much needed to remove this 
potential perverse incentive from the programme. 
42. Nevertheless, the implementation of CCTs in countries without an established tradition of social protection can 
have the indirect beneficial effect of starting to build up both institutions and infrastructure that in the future could 
serve as the basis to effectively deliver a broad set of public services to the poor population. However, the efficacy 
of the CCT programme structure to do so in coordination with line ministries has to be improved in the short run. International Poverty Centre
SBS – Ed. BNDES,10o  andar




Telephone   +55  61  2105 5000
Fax   +55  61  2105 5001